



The Palestinian intelligence and personality to confront the Zionist-Nazis

Cristiano Trindade De Angelis

PhD, Independent Researcher, PhD in Strategy and Project Management, Brasil.

Corresponding Author: Cristiano Trindade De Angelis, PhD, Independent Researcher, PhD in Strategy and Project Management, Brasil.

Received: March 12, 2026; **Published:** March 22, 2026

Abstract

Comparisons between Zionism and Nazism have been made by academics, politicians and public figures, both Jewish and not, since before the establishment of Israel.

As of July 21, 2025, more than 25,000 tonnes of explosives—equivalent to two nuclear bombs—had been dropped on Gaza. The toll had reached catastrophic levels: over 59,000 Palestinians were reported dead, most of them women and children.

Given the support from the United States and 82% of Israelis, some Palestinians are questioning a possible agreement between Hamas and Israel to change people's mindset and make billions without any oversight.

This article seeks to discover how Palestinians are trying to confront this genocide.

The survey in Palestine was distributed to a representative sample of Palestinian residents (from 18 to over 65 years old) of the Princess Alia Governmental Hospital or Hebron Governmental Hospital localized in Hebron, West Bank. In total 256 people was interviewed.

The questionnaire covered the following topics: cultural intelligence, emotional intelligence, and spiritual intelligence.

The main conclusion is that the Palestinians developed this intelligence as a result of learning from the war, where all the universities in Gaza were destroyed and the existing ones (West Bank) do not share knowledge with students.

Key-words: Intelligence, Jews, Palestinians, personality, war

Introduction

The destructive might that the Israeli state wields is backstopped by financial and military assistance from countries, especially the United States, whose support is premised on the ostensible righteousness of the Israeli cause (13).

According to Zionists, in May 1948, five openly hostile Arab nations stood ready to invade Israel. After 2,000 years, an extraordinary series of wars, upheaval in Western politics, and the steadfast faith of American Zionists helped the diaspora return to Eretz Yisrael (25).

In the United States, it is estimated that there are between 5.7 million and 10 million Jewish people¹.

According to the 2000 United States census, 106,839 Americans also hold Israeli citizenship, but the number of Americans of Israeli descent is around half a million.

The leader-bloc combining Netanyahu's Likud, the extreme-right Religious Zionism and two ultraorthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, they are responsible for the genocide in Gaza.

The International Criminal Court is seeking the arrest of Netanyahu and his former defense minister for allegedly using starvation as a method of war².

The survey, conducted by Pennsylvania State University in March 2025, found that 82 percent of Israeli Jews support the forced expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

With such an adverse situation, Palestinians have little alternative but to reconsider Hamas's power over their lives. Would protests against Hamas lead the European Union to help the Palestinians?

Meanwhile, this article is interested in the development of the cultural, emotional, and spiritual intelligence of Palestinians.

¹<https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/jewish-population-by-state>

²<https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendant/netanyahu>

The article is therefore divided into the following sections:

- 1- The emotional, cultural, and spiritual intelligence of Palestinians.
- 2- The personality of Palestinians.
- 3- The real reason for the war between Palestinians and Israelis.
- 4- The 5 personality traits and their impact on cognitive ability.
- 5- The personality of Israelis.

1-The emotional, cultural, and spiritual intelligence of Palestinians.

The survey in Palestine was distributed to a representative sample of Palestinian residents (from

18 to over 65 years old) of the Princess Alia Governmental Hospital or Hebron Governmental Hospital localized in Hebron, West Bank. In total 256 people was interviewed.

The questionnaire covered the following topics: cultural intelligence, emotional intelligence, and spiritual intelligence. The questions are in the appendix to this article. The answers are discussed further below.

From a psychological standpoint, intelligence involves the ability to learn, adapt, solve problems, and use resources effectively (McElya, 2017). Cultural Intelligence (CI) is a specific form of intelligence that enables individuals to operate effectively in diverse cultural settings. It differs from Emotional Intelligence (EI), which focuses more narrowly on managing emotions across contexts (Ang et al., 2007).

According to Mayer and Salovey (1997), EI denotes the ability to accurately perceive, appraise, and express emotion of self and others; to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thoughts; to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth.

Dolev and Shapira (2026) highlight the importance of integrating emotional intelligence (EI) and intercultural sensitivity (IS) to improve intercultural contact (IC) in the context of intractable conflict.

Nakwana et al. (2021), in turn, noted the role of emotion management, demonstrating that higher emotion management was linked to lower levels of prejudice and tendency to support social hierarchies and emotions, descriptions of racism, and a more negative perception toward the Israeli Jewish majority group following the training.

EI alone is insufficient for optimal contact with members of another cultural group, in particular those in intractable conflict. Effective contact requires competencies more directly related to inter-cultural dimensions, in addition to EI.

Wolman (2001) defines Spiritual Intelligence as *“the human capacity to address fundamental questions about the meaning of life, while also experiencing a deep connection with others and the universe.”* In this sense, SI enables individuals to operate from a place of meaning, transcendence, and ethical responsibility.

Zohar and Marshall further conceptualize SI as the intelligence we use to: Assess and resolve problems of meaning and value Place our lives and decisions within a broader existential framework Evaluate which life path or decision is more aligned with our values and purpose

Similarly, Srivastava & Misra (2012) emphasize that Spiritual Intelligence can be developed and applied in any setting—professional, personal, or communal—to promote deeper awareness, maturity, and contribution to collective well-being.

In summary, the three intelligences can be described as follows:

1. Cultural Intelligence (CQ) – related to our values, beliefs, assumptions, and traditions.
2. Emotional Intelligence (EI) – related to our inner emotional world, including feelings, frustrations, and emotional regulation.
3. Spiritual Intelligence (SI) – associated with our relationship with transcendence or God, and linked to humility, ego control, purpose, and worldview.

All respondents answered that they are curious and interested in learning about other cultures in order to develop a new awareness about themselves and others.

Regarding question three on cultural intelligence, the most mature respondents answered that there is confusion among most Israelis in thinking that Palestinians are invaders of their lands.

In question four, there were comments about the avalanche of information linking Palestinians to the terrorist group Hamas. They say that despite Hamas’s narrow victory in the January 25, 2006 elections, they do not trust this group much and cannot say if there is a relationship with Israel to justify the war for the population and billions spent without the need for transparency or legislative authorization.

Regarding the first two questions on emotional intelligence, it was clear that Palestinians have a great ability to create motivation through the union of family and friends. They also have great sensitivity to understand the impact of their actions on other people.

Regarding question three on emotional intelligence, it’s very important to emphasize that Palestinians don’t believe in first impressions. They seek to get to know people gradually and observe qualities such as punctuality and responsibility. Regarding question four, younger people talk more about making decisions based on emotions, while older people say they are more rational, and some mention spirituality.

Palestinians are very focused on their purpose in life: supporting their families. Younger people also follow this path, talking about studying and working to start their own families.

In situations of high stress, Palestinians often pray and take deep breaths to avoid making hasty decisions that might anger Israelis. They are very obedient and disciplined.

They strongly believe in the struggle for the Holy Land and understand that their current situation is related to history. Although most have already left the country, they want to stay. Few said they need an experience abroad.

Regarding question four on spiritual intelligence, it is very interesting to observe how spiritual Palestinians are. They believe in acting guided by Allah in certain circumstances.

Some Palestinians feel that people are very restricted by costumes and traditions. In this case culture is stronger than knowledge (respect family decisions). Culture forces people to decide what they will study or work. You do not have rights to do something against religion.

2-The personality of Palestinians

Zionism is the belief in the Jewish people’s right to self-determination in their ancestral homeland of Israel. It affirms that Jews, like all peoples, have the right to live in safety, dignity, and sovereignty in a nation of their own.

According to Nishikidaa and Hamanaka (19) for displaced Palestinians, life as refugees has continued for more than 60 years following Nakba—the first catastrophe in 1948 deriving from the establishment of the state of Israel. There are about 6.1 million members of the Palestinian diaspora, most of whom live in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Chile.

The Jewish character is emphasized according to the state's founding principle of Zionism, which claims Israel to be a state with a Jewish majority within its borders. At the same time, however, there are more than 1.5 million non-Jewish residents who comprise around 25% of the population (CBS 2010). In addition, the population of the Occupied Territories (which consist of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) exceeds four million as of 2012 (PCBS 2012).

This non-negligible number poses a serious challenge to the political system of Israel as a representative democracy. The leader-bloc combining Netanyahu's Likud, the extreme-right Religious Zionism and two ultraorthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, they are responsible for the genocide in Gaza.

Bergman, Bodner, Cohen-Fridel (28) examined 154 native Israeli citizens, 86 Jewish and 68 Muslim Arabs, who completed measures of ageism, aging anxieties, and cultural views of older adults. It was assumed that Arabs would rate their culture as more tolerant toward older adults, would report spending more time with them, and express lower ageism and aging anxieties.

Western cultures generally value individualism, adhere to a more youth-oriented society and hold negative beliefs regarding older adults and the aging process (e.g. see Wang and Mallinkrodt, 2006). More traditional cultures, however, tend to lean toward more collectivistic values, which support and honor their familial bonds and their elders (e.g. see Boggatz and Dassen, 2005). Traditional cultures emphasize interdependence and connectedness among individuals, and intensely favor natural bonds of affection between all members of the family, meeting one's social obligations and preferring social requirements to the pursuit of personal goals.

Bar-Haim (2025) explain that in Israel, the most prominent ethnic split is between Palestinian Arab Israeli citizens (hereafter: Palestinian Arabs) and Israeli Jews (hereafter: Jews). Palestinian Arabs, who comprise around 20% of the population, are primarily Muslim (80%), with the remainder comprised of Christian, Druze, and other small minority groups. Socially and residentially, Palestinian Arabs and Jews are highly segregated, with only seven cities defined as "mixed communities".³³ Before the establishment of the state of Israel, Palestinian Arabs made up the majority of the population in Palestine. Additionally, with Jewish immigration and the War of Independence in 1948, Arabs became a subordinate minority in social, economic, political, and cultural status.

Feniger et al. (2015) found that while disadvantaged Jewish ethnic groups improved their enrollment in higher education compared to affluent ethnic groups, Palestinian Arabs remained disadvantaged. Similarly, Bar-Haim and Blank (2019) found that in 2016, only 16% of Palestinian Arabs in the age group of 19–35 were admitted to higher education institutions, while the percentage of Jews more than doubled in admission rates.

The unemployment rate among graduates aged 19–29 holding an Associate Diploma Certificate or higher is notably high, standing at 46% (29% in the West Bank compared to 68% in Gaza Strip), according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2023).

Seven decades of Israeli occupation and recurrent conflicts have significantly obstructed the Palestinian higher education system

(Milton et al., 2021). This ongoing war has resulted in the destruction of all universities and the disruption of education for 88,000 university students in Gaza (Scholars Against the War on Palestine, 2024).

(15) state that restrictive measures and conditions imposed by Israel and international donors alike have resulted in a stilted, export-oriented formula of economic growth which has tied the Palestinian economy "to Israeli demand and labor exports rather than to domestic demand and employment" (6). This has not only enabled the continued exploitation of Palestinians as a pool of cheap labor in Israeli towns and settlements on both sides of the Green Line reflects (6; 11), but has contributed, as Sara Roy (24) argues, to a process of "de-development" which is unlike "underdevelopment" in that it entails "the deliberate, systematic and progressive dismemberment of an indigenous economy by a dominant one, where economic – and, by extension, societal – potential is not only distorted but denied"

Fekih-Romdhane et al. (2025) investigated psychometric properties of an Arabic translation of the Perceived Hope Scale (PHS) in Palestinians living in Gaza.

According to Redlich-Amirav et al. (23) several scales have been developed to assess hope, based either on a unidimensional conceptualization of hope (reflecting one dimension, i.e. cognitive process), or multidimensional conceptualization (reflecting the combination of multiple dimensions, e.g., temporal, contextual, behavioural, spiritual, relational, emotional)

Potential eligible participants from all parts of the Gaza Strip affected by war (North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir Al Balah, Rafah, Khan Younis) were invited to participate in an Internet-based survey.

In terms of concurrent validity of the Arabic PHS, results showed that perceived hope scores significantly correlated in a positive way with religiosity, resilience and post-traumatic growth. In addition, and as expected, PHS inversely correlated with negative mental health indicators (anxiety and depression). This is consistent with the extensive literature indicating that hope not only buffers against psychopathology [12; 3], but also promotes resilience and growth [Senger, 2023].

Another study conducted by Aldabbour et al. (2024) found that Stress was the most frequently identified predictor of Depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

It is important to note that the development of cultural, emotional, and spiritual intelligence has led Palestinians to control their stress levels, and therefore their depression and anxiety.

3-The real reason for the war between Palestinians and Israelis.

Hamas's presence attracted attention as one of the Islamic parties that became prominent after the

Islamic revival in the 1970s and as a rival movement to Fatah—the secular dominant faction of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Front)—in Palestinian politics. The secular Fatah party and Hamas, a Sunni Islamist party, have been at loggerheads since the late 1980s.

In fact, the continuous split between Fatah and Hamas has kept Palestinian politics in the OPTs in stalemate (Tokoro & Tomizawa, 2021).

Hamas is an organization that has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relationship with its original organization in Egypt, Israel, Arab countries, and within the international community

³ Faculty of Education, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel

From a very early period, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was very concerned about the developments in Palestine and supported the Arabic rebellion against the Jews.

After defeat in the war of 1948, the land left unoccupied in Palestine was divided into areas controlled either by Egypt or Jordan.

While there were no local universities in the Gaza Strip, the Egyptian government permitted Palestinian students from Gaza to study in Egypt and allocated a specific quota for students from Palestine, but the coordination was suspended after occupation by Israel in the war of 1967 (27). Nowadays some Palestinian children are able to attend school in Egypt – providing they pay the exorbitant international school fees (\$25,000 per term) that only a privileged few can afford.⁴

No Arab states endorsed Hamas setting itself up as an alternative to the PLO (Palestine Liberation Front). However, while its victory in the parliamentary election in 2006 was not accepted by European countries and their allies, Hamas has played a significant role in Palestinian and regional politics.

Apart from the majority of Arab countries, Iran condemned the move from their position as a supporter of the Islamic cause in Palestine and preferred to build relations with Hamas rather than Fatah. The Hamas office was opened in Tehran in February 1992 (Hroub, 2000)

Russia, Iran, and Qatar came to be pivotal partners and continued financial aid to the Gaza Strip.

It has been estimated that Iran has contributed at least 280 million US dollars annually to the Hamas entity in Gaza in recent years; much of this through arms (Ezbidi 2013, 101).

While Hamas lost their strategic base and support from Syria and Egypt, they gained support from another source: the pro-Brotherhood countries. Turkey, through AKP's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has shown its solidarity with the Muslim Brotherhood, including Hamas.

Qatar is another country that elevated its support of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring. Its emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-thani, offered an assistance package worth 400 million US dollars during his visit to Gaza in October 2012.

These background circumstances prompted the Gaza War of 2014 and motivated Hamas to take actions toward the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

The chronological development suggests a link between the Arab Spring in 2011 and the Gaza War of 2014.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the murderers of the three kidnapped teenagers “beasts,” and claimed, “Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay” (Ravid, Lis and Ha’aretz 2014). The controversial kidnapping of the Jewish teenagers leads to the the revenge murder of a teenage Palestinian boy in East Jerusalem provoked anger among Palestinians, both in Jerusalem and in the occupied territories.

On October 7, 2023, southern Israel was subjected to a large-scale coordinated attack, considered the deadliest in the country's history and among the most severe globally in terms of casualties relative to population size (Satloff, 2023). The assault began with a widespread rocket barrage launched from the Gaza Strip by Hamas, followed by the infiltration of approximately 4000 militants from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Liebermann, 2023; Vinograd and Kershner, 2023). By the

end of the day, more than 1100 individuals had been killed, around 1600 wounded, and over 239 people abducted to Gaza (Codish et al., 2024; Levany et al., 2023). In addition, approximately 250,000 residents were displaced from their homes within Israel.

In the Gaza Strip, where Israel's retaliatory offensive has killed tens of thousands of people and razed entire towns and cities, those who can are fleeing another Israeli invasion of Gaza City while others are sheltering in place. Experts and major rights groups have accused Israel of genocide.

Gaza has a very high percentage of young people. About 75% of Gaza's population is under the age of 25. No Jews are living in Gaza today.

The Gaza Strip is often called one of the most densely populated areas on earth. Gaza City itself is likely the 40th most densely populated urban area globally.

Gaza is the largest city of the State of Palestine with an estimated population of 750,000 in 2015.

The agreement between Hamas and Fatah, along with 12 other Palestinian parties, signed on 23.07.2024 in China, is not recognized by Israel, as it would give the parties the right to govern Gaza after the end of the war between Hamas and Israel.

As of September 2024, the death toll from the ongoing conflict has topped 40,000 Palestinians, and the casualties are nearly 92,000 [22]. Besides its ferocity, the conflict was also marked by severe food, water, and medical supply shortages and the wide-scale destruction of infrastructure [21]. Mass displacement of the civilian population was another significant aspect of this conflict. The UN estimates that 90% of the Gaza population, roughly 1.9 million, has been displaced at least once since the beginning of the war [7].

According to Sovbetov (2025) as of July 21, 2025, more than 25,000 tonnes of explosives—equivalent to two nuclear bombs—had been dropped on Gaza (Wells et al., 2024). The toll had reached catastrophic levels: over 59,000 Palestinians were reported dead, most of them women and children; 142,000 were injured; more than two million were displaced; and over 90 % of essential civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip was destroyed. These events sparked an unprecedented wave of condemnation that extended far beyond state-level diplomacy.

Keeping track of the status of President Donald Trump's 20-point plan, on 25.09.2025, for a ceasefire that would end Hamas' rule in Gaza and rebuilding the territory after a devastating war.

Israel continues to attack Gaza from the air, sea, and land, despite the ceasefire officially remaining in effect. According to the Gaza Ministry of Health, since the ceasefire agreement came into effect on October 10, 2025 and through January 17, 2026, Israeli forces killed 464 people, including at least 100 children, according to UNICEF, and injured 1,275.

Israel says its strikes have been in response to Palestinian violations, including people entering Israeli-held parts of Gaza.

Besides the obstructions on the Humanitarian Response, Israel has systematically reduced the area in which Palestinians can be present. On January 16, reports indicated that Israel again moved blocks marking part of the route of the Yellow Line westward, thereby once again reducing the area where residents are permitted to be.⁵

This widespread destruction has gained attention from the scientific community, with scholars describing it as *educide* (1) or *scholasticide*

⁴<https://newint.org/education/2025/no-status-no-school-palestinian-children-egypt>

⁵https://gisha.org/en/the-humanitarian-catastrophe-in-gaza-facts-and-figures_eng/

(Scholars Against the War on Palestine, 2024), reflecting a deliberate strategy to hinder social and economic development through the demolition of educational infrastructure and intellectual figures (Rabaia and Habash, 2024).

Although the protesters primarily focus on Israeli politics, there have been warnings about a rise in antisemitism in both Western and non-Western countries. Particularly in the United Kingdom, reported incidents of antisemitism increased by 589 % (i.e., 4103 incidents for 2023) after October 7th, 2023, compared to the same period the previous year (Sherwood, 2023).

Ozer, Milan Obaidi and Bergh (2025) explain that currently in the United Kingdom, antisemitism is estimated to be prevalent among 10 % of the general population. It is more widespread among 18–34-year-olds (13 %) compared to those over 50 years old (8 %), among males more than females (16 % vs. 5 %), and more so among Christians than those reporting no religion or Atheists (8 % vs. 4 %). Overall, they suggest that the war in Gaza may have increased anti-Jewish hostility in the United Kingdom, but not antisemitism.

Davis and Alexander (2025) found that as the majority of American Jews successfully integrated into American society in the second half of the twentieth century and began to eschew traditional Jewish practice, the concern for sustaining Jewish identity became a focus of Jewish educational efforts (Charmé et al., 2008). This concern was especially pronounced in liberal Jewish institutions associated with the Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative movements, and to a lesser extent the left wing of the modern Orthodox movement (as opposed to the various branches of mainstream Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Judaism). This reflects a tradition in Jewish schooling to emphasize Israel education as a curricular feature of Jewish education in liberal, English-speaking countries such as the United States (Attias, 2015; Chazan, 1978, 2004, 2014; Dinin, 1944; Kuselewitz, 1958). The teachers in the United States, Canada, and Australia taught at independent, non-state Jewish high schools affiliated with various denominations of liberal Judaism (Davis & Alexander, 2025).

There is near unanimous agreement that a distinguishing characteristic of Israel education is to impact the Jewish identity of the learner (Davis & Alexander, 2023).

When experienced as the countercultural form of Jewish education that we propose, Israel education can allow students to engage distinct Jewish visions of the good life outside the default liberal-religious paradigm prominent in liberal, English-speaking countries and be exposed to liberal-national conceptions that provide meaningful opportunities for thick, authentic Jewish identity development (Davis & Alexander, 2025).


Waldman et al. (2022) worked in a Genome-wide data generated for 33 individuals whose skeletons were rescued from a late medieval Jewish cemetery in Erfurt, Germany. Medieval German Jews had similar genetic ancestry to modern Ashkenazi Jews but were more genetically heterogeneous, likely divided into two or more distinct groups. The medieval Jews showed evidence of an extreme founder event, including high levels of runs of homozygosity and distinctive genetic variants shared with modern Ashkenazi Jews.

The study reveals unexpected genetic subgroups in medieval German Ashkenazi Jews and sheds light on the “founder event” in which a small population gave rise to most present-day Ashkenazi Jews.

Das et al. (29) identified “ancient Ashkenaz,” a region in northeastern Turkey that harbors four primeval villages whose names resemble

Ashkenaz. The term acquired its modern meaning only after a critical mass of Ashkenazic Jews arrived in Germany.

Customs and Traditions Over Time Ashkenazi Jews preserved strong ties to the Hebrew Scriptures and rabbinic literature.



Ashkenazi Jews believe their relatives came from Germany and Eastern Europe, which remember the earlier journey from Israel.

Most Jewish Americans - as many as 95% — are Ashkenazi Jews that were descended from the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe. The majority of these people were born in the United States.

Although there are many theories for why Mizrahi Jews align themselves with the right-wing, one explanation could be due to the ethnic divide. Because the Ashkenazi elite represent the majority of the left-wing parties, Mizrahi Jews have aligned themselves with right-wing groups in opposition to the Ashkenazi left⁶

Yosef Mizrahi is a leading Orthodox Jewish outreach rabbi and Kalman Ber (Ashkenazi) and David Yosef (Sephardi) are the Chief Rabbis of Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, prime Minister of Israel, is a member of the Likud party, which is a major right-wing political party in Israel. Netanyahu's main ally is the rabbi Otzma Yehudit, the Minister of Defense. The far-right, ultra-nationalist Religious Zionism party secured a raft of achievements in its coalition agreement with Netanyahu. The opposition parties also have agreements with Likud.

Itamar Ben-Gvir's right-wing Otzma Yehudit Party returned to the Israeli government, almost two months after resigning in protest due to the ceasefire with Hamas in Gaza. The party has been widely described in the international press as an extremist, ultranationalist, and racist organisation supporting Jewish supremacy and has been described by multiple sources, including the Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz, as a “Jewish fascist group”. Israel's Supreme Court dismissed a petition that sought to disqualify National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir from his ministerial position due to his criminal record.

Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews in America includes academics, artists, writers, and civic and religious leaders who contributed chapters focusing on the Sephardi and Mizrahi experience in America.

Orthodox Jewish outreach, often referred to as Kiruv or Keruv, is the collective work or movement of Orthodox Judaism that reaches out to non-Orthodox Jews to encourage belief in God and to live according to Orthodox Jewish law.

The Orthodox Union's Synagogue Initiatives provides programmatic support to Orthodox communities and congregations throughout North America.⁷

⁶<https://opentext.ku.edu/israelsdivides/chapter/mizrahi-ashkenazi/>

⁷<https://jewishsa.org/orthodox-unions-synagogue-support-network/>

Before World War II, American Jews often embraced a racially “Hebrew” self-definition, deploying it selectively, despite its widespread use by White nationalists and antisemites, as a positive way to signify Jewish distinctiveness (Goldstein 2006, 81).

Haynes (9) answered the following question: How can Jews be part of a fight against systemic racism when racial subordination is foundational to White privilege?

The demographic characteristics of American Jewry have been evolving since the 1950s but became far more racially complicated in the 1960s, just when presumptions of Jewishness assimilation into Whiteness were growing (Dollinger 2024).

And despite the increasing visibility of non-White Jews, most Americans continued to think of ancestral German Ashkenazi Jews as not only representative of all Jews, but also of being the benchmark of Judaic practice and what we think of as Jewish cultural authenticity (Yiddishkeit) (Gordon 2016)

In 2017 was conducted a survey by Bankier-Karp and Graham (2024) with 7611 Australian Jews. For example, smaller shares of Australian Jews indicated they were following news in Israel very (30%) or somewhat (67%) closely, while post October 7, almost all (98%) Australian Jewish adults were following the Israel–Hamas war very (79%) or fairly (19%) closely (Bankier-Karp and Graham 2024).

The survey, conducted in March 2025 found that 47 percent of Israeli Jews answered yes to the question: “Do you support the claim that the [Israeli army] in conquering an enemy city, should act in a manner similar to the way the Israelites did when they conquered Jericho under the leadership of Joshua, ie to kill all its inhabitants?”

The same poll showed that the Israeli public also supports the continuation of the full blockade that Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip since the beginning of March. It found that 53 percent of the Israeli public think that Israel should not allow humanitarian aid into the enclave.

Israelis and Palestinians have failed to reach a lasting peace agreement despite substantial investments by various parties in a long-term peace process (e.g., the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, the Madrid Conference of 1991, the 2013–2014 Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks).

There are clearly a number of complex geopolitical issues that almost certainly contribute to the failure to find a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (e.g., the exact borders of the two states, mutual recognition, water rights, control of Jerusalem, Palestinian right of return), but sociopsychological barriers are also likely to play at least some role in the persistence of this conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015; Ross & Ward, 1995).

In essence, according to Zeigler-Hill and Besser (2021) the dangerous social worldview involves perceiving the social environment to be a place where “good, decent people’s values and way of life are threatened by bad people” (Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 92). This tendency to view the world as a dangerous place is believed to activate motivations concerning social cohesion, control, and collective security that lead to the development of right-wing authoritarianism (i.e., a set of beliefs that involve a preference for traditional values, submission to authority figures, ethnocentrism, and hostility toward other social groups; Altemeyer, 1981) in an effort to satisfy the desire for safety (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt et al., 2002; Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013b; Sibley et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009).

Despite their similarities, right-wing authoritarianism and social

dominance orientation tend to be associated with prejudice toward different group. As expected, the dangerous social worldview had an indirect association with attitudes toward peace with the Palestinians through right-wing authoritarianism via the perceived threat from the Palestinians.

Berman (2000) uses club theory to explain what may be seen as irrational behavior on the part of Israeli ultra-Orthodox communities. The communities’ remarkable mutual-insurance network, he found, compensates them for members’ strict religious practices.

Based on sixteen gender-separated focus groups comprising 128 ultra-Orthodox men and women, Shahar, Yuval and Tur-Sinai (2024) explored several questions: Who guides the medical decisions of ultra-Orthodox Jews—their rabbis or their doctors? Under what conditions? In what order? Who has the last word?

The Israeli ultra-Orthodox Jewish community provides an appropriate case study for the intersection of religion and health care. This strictly religious Jewish community comprises three main sub-communities: Lithuanians, Hasidim, and Sephardim (Jews originally from Arabic, Farsi, and Turkic-speaking countries).

Together, they formed 13% of Israel’s population (Malach & Cahaner, 2022).

Their religious and social life is bounded by the strict interpretation of halakha, Jewish religious law, and unquestioning faith in rabbinic authority (Brown & Leon, 2017; Soloveitchik, 1994). Many have connections with Israeli government elements and other modern institutions (Caplan & Stadler, 2009). Patients have cited numerous examples of situations in which the rabbi’s opinion was better than that of the doctor, who, they said, kept making mistakes (Shaked, 2009).

From a theoretical point of view, this complicated discussion about medical decision-making that focuses on the relationship between rabbis and patients may be part of the moral and epistemological conflict between science and religion (Evans, 2011; Evans & Evans, 2008).

The Hebrew word Haredi refers to stringently observant Jews, sometimes referred to by outsiders as ultra-Orthodox. Haredi encompasses Chasidish and Yeshivish Jews – the two largest subgroups – and functions as an umbrella category for many sects that differ in religious practice, dress, gendered norms of modesty, and engagement with the non-Haredi world (10).

Hirsch et al. (10) made interviews with key experts on Haredi life within and outside of the community and changemakers. The sample of individuals who had been married in New York-area Haredi communities was used to explain how secular and religious law are used as instruments of coercive control against people (usually women) who seek a divorce because of abuse.

The rise of an ultra-Orthodox middle class in recent decades (Malach & Cahaner, 2022; Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012) may have exacerbated inequality within the community. The voices of ambivalence, minor signs of criticism, and independent deliberations may all be evidence of these changes.

The Ultra-Orthodox society in Israel, which for years was characterized by seclusion and separation from secular society in Europe and later in the State of Israel, is partially undergoing a process of opening up to the external secular world. In the last two decades, there has been an increase in the number of Ultra-Orthodox students in academia, a significant rise in the number of men and women from Ultra-Orthodox society entering the workforce (26).

Rabbi David Leybel has already registered significant achievements in integrating Haredim into the workforce. Now he's turning his sights on military service.

Mandatory military service, known as conscription, is a legal requirement for Jewish Israeli citizens and certain non-Jewish communities, such as the Druze and Circassians, to serve in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Established in 1949, a year after Israel's founding, this policy ensures national security in a region marked by persistent geopolitical tensions. The length of service depends on gender: Men serve for approximately 32 months. Women typically serve for 24 months. In Israel, most citizens are obligated to serve in the military for a mandatory period and subsequently in the reserve forces for about 21–45 days per year up to the age of 44. Many veterans continue to serve in the reserves for even longer periods. However, uncharacteristically, during 2023, reservists were linked to the social protest in Israel. The ever-widening public protest in Israel was unprecedented. Every Saturday night, from January 2023 until the War of October 7th began, 5–10% of the Israeli population headed out to demonstrate in the streets of various cities and regions against the anti-democratic legislation that was under consideration or had been passed (8).

All the while, Yair Netanyahu, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 32-year-old son, lived in a luxurious Miami apartment, accompanied by a taxpayer-funded security detail, and shared polarizing social media posts against his father's political opponents⁸.

According to Elran and Sheffer (4) the starting point of the economic discussion is the contrasting nature of the two methods of conscription: compulsory conscription mandated by law and voluntary enlistment based on market forces.

In actuality, compulsory conscription can be justified from an economic perspective only in exceptional situations requiring unusually large numbers of manpower for an extended period of time, as in the case of long wars or as a result of some other ongoing state of emergency

In conclusion, military service in Israel suffers from an element of distortion, and using civilian service as a means of solving the problem of inequality in sharing of the burden is only likely to result in further distortion (4).

It is important to highlight the effects of the war on the Israeli economy.

Sovbetov (2025) holds that the results reveal a clear dual-channel effect. First, the war itself imposed a direct short-run valuation loss, particularly for high-visibility firms and tradable sectors, consistent with the literature on political risk premiums and wartime volatility (Ahmed et al., 2023; Chowdhury & Khan, 2024). Second, and more importantly, foreign reputational backlash had a persistent and asymmetric effect on Israeli firm performance that was most pronounced in Muslim-majority countries, where calls for boycott and divestment were strongest. For policymakers, the findings highlight reputational externalities as a new channel of vulnerability: humanitarian norm violations can generate economic spillovers onto the private sector even in the absence of formal sanctions.

It is clear that the main reason for the war is the ego of ultra-Orthodox Jews. This ego is so large that it raises suspicions about the relationship between Hamas and Israel, given the great advantages they have gained from this war, advantages that go far beyond the support of less radical Jews.

4-The 5 personality traits and their impact on cognitive ability.

Sociologists, economists, and psychologists regularly emphasize the fact that an individual's socioeconomic status is influenced not only by cognitive abilities but also by noncognitive skills, including personality traits (Bihagen et al., 2013; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Cheng & Furnham, 2014; Collischon, 2021; Dunn et al., 1995; Farkas, 2003; Heckman et al., 2006; Heineck & Anger, 2010; Jackson, 2006; Protsch & Solga, 2015; Shanahan et al., 2014; Wehner et al., 2022).

The five basic personality trait theory was initiated by Fiske [10], and further developed by many researchers such as Norman [42], Smith and Kihlstrom [59], Goldberg (1981), and McCrae and Costa (1987)

The Big Five personality traits (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism- the opposite pole of emotional stability - has been commonly used to assess individual differences in personality.

The first trait, openness to experience, reflects an individual's tendency to be curious, imaginative, and open to new ideas and experiences (Judge et al., 2002). Openness is a personality trait that focuses on creativity and imagination.

According to Boonyapison, Sittironnarit & Rattanaumpawan (2025) Conscientiousness is a personality trait that focuses on the ability to be thoughtful and well-planned.

Extraversion is a personality trait that focuses on sociability and outgoingness. Agreeableness is a personality trait that focuses on trust and kindness towards others.

Neuroticism, the last Big Five personality trait, is a personality trait that focuses on emotional instability to negative stimuli.

Neuroticism indicates an individual's susceptibility to negative emotions like anxiety, fear, and sadness. Individuals high in neuroticism are more prone to communication difficulties, as anxiety and negativity can hinder clear and effective communication, impacting team collaboration (Silvester et al., 2014).

Similarly, Kaoropthai and Dryver (2025) explained that the conscientiousness trait represents a person's level of organization, self-discipline, and reliability. Individuals high in conscientiousness tend to be detail-oriented, dependable, and meticulous in task performance (Sackett and Walmsley, 2014).

The extraversion trait reflects a person's level of sociability, talkativeness, and assertiveness. Extraverted individuals are more likely to ask questions, share information, and initiate conversations (Wilmot et al., 2019), fostering knowledge exchange.

The agreeableness trait signals an individual's tendency to be cooperative, trusting, and helpful (Judge et al., 2002). Highly agreeable individuals are inclined to foster collaboration, maintain positive dynamics, and promote trust (Huang et al., 2014).

Using findings from a survey experiment, Wehner et al. (2022) analyzed German employers' preferences and found that conscientiousness and agreeableness were rated as the most desirable traits.

The results found by Kamaraju et al. (2011) go in the same direction and confirmed that there were significant relationships among the Big Five, learning styles, and academic performance, and there was a significant relationship between personality types and learning styles.

Agreeableness and conscientiousness were found to be the first two dominant personality types, whereas GAO (group activity orientation) and PO (project orientation) were preferable to IAO (individual activity orientation).

⁸TheMarker, 14 February 2024, <https://web.archive.org/web/20240525105421/https://www.themarker.com/captain-internet/2024-02-14/ty-article/0000018d-a909-d0cb-a5ef-bb2fef4e0000>.

According to Gonzalez-Peña et al. (2025) agreeableness, despite its prosocial nature, was not found to have a significant relationship with happiness, some theoretical considerations can be observed that help qualify these results in individuals with high levels of this personality trait.

Such individuals are often perceived as warm and empathetic, with a disposition that drives them to seek social harmony (Graziano & Tobin, 2009). While this tendency can foster positive interpersonal relationships, it can also compromise their well-being when they prioritize the needs of others over their own (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

In organizational contexts, agreeableness may facilitate collaborative work environments; however, elevated levels of cordiality can also inhibit decision-making capacity, hinder negotiation in conflict situations, or undermine the protection of personal interests—particularly in the case of entrepreneurs (Matz & Gladstone, 2020).

Finally, neuroticism is characterized by a personality disparity between emotional adjustment and emotional stability. Persons that display neurotic qualities, such as anxiety, sadness, aggressiveness, self-consciousness, impulsivity, and sensitivity, have lower positive affect than emotionally stable people (Costa & McCrea, 1992; Zhao & Seibert, 2006). Entrepreneurs with high degrees of neuroticism are more likely to exhibit risk aversion, which is considered as an impediment in the attributes of entrepreneurship. However, according to the literature, traumatic events are part of the neurotic antecedents that limit the capacity to work well in controlled contexts, encouraging their independence via the establishment of businesses (Caird, 1990; Cohen & Danielson, 2015).

A study entitled “Big Five personality traits and academic performance in Russian Universities, using machine learning, indicated that introversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness had significant relationships with academic achievement, whereas conscientiousness was found to be relatively less important (Nye, Orel & Kochergina, 2013).

Further, Meyer et al. (16) investigated the relationship between the personality traits and academic achievement of 3,637 upper-secondary school students in Germany and the results revealed that conscientiousness predicted grades and final exams in both mathematics and English. Additionally, conscientiousness had a significant relationship with mathematic test scores, whereas openness was positively related to English test scores. Another research study conducted by Muhid et al. (17) examined the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and the academic achievement of 2,145 senior high school students in Indonesia, and the findings indicated that all five personality traits were significant predictors of students’ academic performance. Interestingly, the two most significant predictors appeared to be emotional stability and openness to experience.

Boonyapison, Sittironnarit & Rattanaumpawan (2025) explained that of all Big Five personality traits, the conscientiousness personality is universally considered the strongest predictor for good academic performance at all school levels.

Nevertheless, Rammstedt et al. (2026) found that among the Big Five traits, Openness to Experience—and, to a lesser extent, Emotional Stability (as the positive pole of Negative Emotionality)—show the strongest positive associations with cognitive ability. By contrast, Conscientiousness sometimes shows negative associations with cognitive ability (e.g., Moutafi et al., 2004) which, however, was not evident in the meta-analyses (see Anglim et al., 2022; Stanek & Ones, 2023). For Agreeableness and Extraversion associations with cognitive ability are typically negligible (e.g. Anglim et al., 2022; Stanek & Ones, 2023).

Openness, the trait most strongly linked to cognitive ability, it became obvious that the facets Curiosity and Aesthetic Sensitivity are particularly relevant, whereas the facet Creative Imagination is not.

Since Palestinians live in a prison, they are the most open and curious to learn about other cultures. Due to the strong discipline of living their days monitored by the Israeli armed forces, they end up developing a high level of conscientiousness. Palestinians are excessively pleasant and sweet. A little introverted due to fear.

5-The personality of Israelis.

Liberal Jewish stakeholders, communal leaders, researchers, and educators sought to confront the challenge of what they began to describe as Jewish continuity by strengthening Jewish identity through Jewish education (Herman, 1977; Levisohn & Kelman, 2019)

This research identifies and distinguishes linear levels of Jewish identity ranging from “weak” to “strong” or evaluates Jewish identity based on various metrics such as opinions regarding Israel, the desire to date or marry someone Jewish, having Jewish friends, belief in God, or positions on certain Jewish values.

Some scholars have recently questioned the accepted view regarding the need for Jewish education to emphasize Jewish identity as part of a strategic objective to ensure Jewish continuity or survival. Prominent among such critics are Jon Levisohn and Ari Kelman (2019), who argue that studies promoting Jewish education as a tool to strengthen Jewish identity as part of a broader goal to impact Jewish continuity misunderstand or misrepresent the complex nature of identity formation and its intersectional nature (Levisohn & Kelman, 2019, p. XI), the authors argue that educators should redirect their efforts from Jewish identity outcomes toward matters such as facilitating strategies for Jewish growth (Zelkowitz, 2019), teaching Jewish linguistic proficiency beyond Hebrew (Benor & Avineri, 2019), encouraging Jewish cultural engagement and civic activism (Kelman, 2019), initiating learners into particular Jewish practices (Levisohn, 2019), or promoting adopting Jewish sensibilities (Moore & Woocher, 2019).

An ethical identity, in this view, provides individuals the opportunity to make determinations about their individuality while in conversation with something bigger than themselves, such as, history, citizenship, culture, helping those in need, or God (Taylor, 1992).

However, Judaic studies curricula include a range of subject matter courses depending on the denominational affiliation of the institution, which may include courses on Hebrew language, Torah, Jewish Law, Jewish History, and Israel education (Alexander, 2018).

In summary, What do you mean by Jewish?

It is impossible to talk about Jews without explaining the liberal-national paradigm prominent in the Jewish state.

According to Loeffler (2020) the story of Jews and liberalism has long been told as a unidirectional process by which Jews relinquished premodern collective autonomy in order to become individual citizens.

As one teacher summarized this challenge, “[Students] forget the thread that Jewish isn’t exclusively a religion. From class to class, they keep forgetting.” Addressing the non-religious, collective aspects of Jewishness in Liberal Jewish identity and the pedagogy of Israel education liberal Jewish education has become especially important since the events of October 7, 2023 and the ensuing war, during which the very idea of Jewish national identity and the right of self-determination for Jews in their ancestral homeland has been challenged among progressives around the world (Alexander, 2024).

In this idea of possessing the homeland, and fighting “against” Hamas, it was easy for the Israeli rulers to sell the idea of mandatory military service.

According to data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the average salary for a civilian in Israel is around NIS 8,000-10,000 (approximately \$2,200-\$2,800 USD) per month.⁹

Is the model of a “people’s army” still relevant to contemporary Israel and the IDF, or should this model be modified in light of career of young Israelis?

The ongoing conflict between Israel and its neighbors, in particular Palestine, has played a significant role in the development of Israeli society, its institutional settings, and its imagined shared identity. As of 2025, Israel’s population is 10.148 million, of which the Israeli government estimates 7.76 million as Jews, 2.13 million as Arabs.

A 2006 study found that almost 10% of the general Israeli population lives abroad, particularly in Russia (5).

The United States continues to be Israelis’ favorite long-distance destination. In 2023, over 301,000 Israelis traveled to the United States for both business and leisure.¹⁰

This demonstrates that Israelis like extremes, Russia and the United States.

The personality of Jews, in the case of young people, as we have seen, is divided into two groups: one linked to religion and the other linked to the armed forces. Those who are more linked to religion wear black clothes and those who are linked to the armed forces wear green clothes.

Everyone is raised with the idea that Palestine invaded the holy land and Palestinians should be treated as enemies.

The Palestinians are poor and oppressed, and the Israelis are “rich” and live their freedom in comfort.

Conclusion

This study analyzed the development of cultural, emotional, and spiritual intelligence in Palestine and found that, through the development of these intelligences, Palestinians are able to control stress, anxiety, and depression. The interviews also revealed a high level of conscientiousness, sweetness, and introspection. This positively impacts the cognitive capacity of Palestinians, which is a fight against the blockage of access to knowledge, also in the West Bank.

The study also discussed the real reason for the war between Israelis and Palestinians and found that there is a very large ego on the part of ultra-Orthodox Jews, which fuels the use of Hamas as a justification for killing innocent families.

Regarding the personality of Israelis, based on statistical data and a review of other studies, the study found the use of religion and good salaries in the armed forces (mandatory) as a mechanism to manipulate young Israelis into fighting against Palestinians. As a solution, the work proposes that the Palestinians begin to review their relationship with the terrorist group Hamas, which could lead to support from the European Community and pressure on the United States to stop supporting Israel.

SURVEY PALESTINE

I. Cultural Intelligence

1. The culture and environment where I live has a strong impact on my way of thinking and acting.
2. I am curious and interested in learning about other cultures in order to develop a new awareness about myself and others.
3. Globalization and interdependence increase intercultural interactions and also increase the likelihood of cultural misunderstandings and conflicts.
4. Today’s society (network society), which produces an avalanche of information without meaning, context, or credibility, leads people to lose focus and have difficulty finding the truth in a situation.

II. Emotional Intelligence

1. I am able to motivate myself and persist in the face of frustration.
2. I have the ability to understand myself and understand the impact on others.
3. I make decisions based on the provisional truth of the situation, what is known today, what is revealed, not the truth that will be tomorrow or at a later time.
4. I interpret my problems primarily based on my culture and my emotions.

III. Spiritual Intelligence

1. I feel I can explain my life purpose to others and can consistently maintain focus on that purpose.
2. In a high-stress situation, I can activate my spirit, focusing on simplifying what appears complex and confusing.
3. I have the ability to re-examine my thoughts and experiences within a new context (spiritual intelligence), gaining a clearer understanding of the deeper causes of things.
4. When dealing with life’s problems, you sometimes have to act on a hunch without knowing why.

References

1. Alousi, R. (2022), “Educide: the Genocide of Education A case study on the impact of invasion, and conflict on education”, *The Business and Management Review*, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 8-9.
2. Bonney S, Stickley T. et al: (2008) “Recovery and mental health: a review of the British literature”. *J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs*;15(2): pp140–53.
3. Murphy ER. Et al: (2023) “Hope and well-being”. *Curr Opin Psychol*; 50: pp101558.
4. Elran, M. and Sheffer, G. et al; (2016) “Military Service in Israel: Challenges and Ramifications Editors Tel Aviv University”. *Institute for National Security Studies*.
5. Eric, Gold; Moav, Omer et al: (2006), “Brain Drain From Israel (Brichat Mochot M’Yisrael) (in Hebrew), Jerusalem: Mercaz Shalem – The Shalem Center”, *The Social-Economic Institute*, p. 26
6. Farsakh, L. et al: (2016). “Palestinian economic development: Paradigm shifts since the first Intifada”. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 45(2), pp55–71.
7. (GISHA) Lcfcfom. Et al: (2024) “Gaza Now: Current facts and figures”. 2024. August 14.

⁹<https://www.civil-war.net/how-much-do-israeli-soldiers-get-paid/>

¹⁰<https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/israels-us-bound-travel-and-tourism-market-2024>

8. Harel, A. et al: (2024). "Refusal to serve in the Israel Defense Forces reserves in an era of anti-democratic judicial reform. *Critical Military Studies*",10(4), pp562–567.
9. Haynes, B. D. et al: (2024) "Surrounded by Darkness, Enfolded in Light: Factors Influencing the Mental Health of Australian Jews in the October 7 Aftermath Adina L. Bankier-Karp 1" · *David Graham Contemporary Jewry* 44: pp903–935
10. Hirsch, J.S. et al; (2026) "Forced marriage, divorce, and the ecology of marital self-determination: findings from research with Orthodox Jews in New York", *SSM - Mental Health*, Volume 9,
11. Khalidi, R. et al: (2016). "Twenty-first century Palestinian development studies". *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 45(4), pp7–15.
12. Leite A, Medeiros A, et al; (2019) "Hope theory and its relation to depression: a systematic review". *Annals Psychiatry Clin Neurosci*, 2(2).
13. Lizotte, C. et al: (2025). "The present and absent Jew in anti-Zionist geographic imaginaries, *Political Geography*", Volume 121, pp103350.
14. Loeffler, J. et al: (2020). "A Certain Type of Liberalism": Minority Rights in Jewish Liberal Discourse, 1848–1948. In: Green, A., Levis Sullam, S. (eds) *Jews, Liberalism, Antisemitism*. Palgrave Critical Studies of Antisemitism and Racism". *Palgrave Macmillan, Cham*.
15. McGahern, Dalal Iriqat, Amin Al-Haj, et al: (2024) "Building a border-city university in occupied Palestine: Developing a cross-border "resistance economy" in practice, *Political Geography*", Volume 108, pp103030
16. Meyer J, Fleckenstein J, Retelsdorf J, Köller O. et al: (2019) "The relationship of personality traits and different measures of domain-specific achievement in upper secondary education". *Learn Individ Differ*;69: pp45–59.
17. Muhid A, Ridho A, Yusuf A, et al; (2021) "Big five personality test for State Islamic senior high school students in Indonesia". *Int J Instr*;14(2): pp483–500.
18. Neriya-Ben Shahrar R, Yuval F, Tur-Sinai A. et al: (2024) ""I Would Consult a Doctor, But What the Rabbi Says Goes": Ultra-Orthodox Jews' Relationships with Rabbis and Doctors in Israel". *J Relig Health*. Jun;63(3): pp1905-1933.
19. Nishikidaa, A. Hamanaka, S. et al: (2013). "Palestinian Migration Under the Occupation: Influence of Israeli Democracy and Stratified Citizenship".
20. Nye JV, Orel E, Kochergina E. et al: (2013) "Big five personality traits and academic performance in Russian universities". *SSRN Electron J*.
21. OCHAOPT. (2024) "Humanitarian Situation Update" #205 | Gaza Strip. August 16, 2024.
22. OCHAOPT. (2024) "Humanitarian Situation Update#174| Gaza Strip".
23. Redlich-Amirav D, et al; (2018) "Psychometric properties of Hope scales: a systematic review". *Int J Clin Pract*;72(7): ppe13213.
24. Roy, S. et al: (2007). "Failing peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Pluto Press. Una Scholars Against the War on Palestine (2024), Senger AR. Hope's relationship with resilience and mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic". *Curr Opin Psychol*. 2023;50: pp101559.
25. Simpson, T. et al: (2024). "PhD Thesis. Foundational American Faith and Support for Zionism, the Yishuv and the Haganah", 1945-1948: Ein Brera
26. Suzin, A. et al: (2025). "Modern ultra-orthodoxy? A critical reassessment. *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*", 24(2), pp393–422.
27. Tamimi: Hamas et al: (2022) "A History from Within; Chehab: Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement; and Lybarger: Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories".
28. Yoav S. Bergman, Ehud Bodner, Sara Cohen-Fridel, et al: (2013) "Cross-cultural ageism: ageism and attitudes toward aging among Jews and Arabs in Israel", *International Psychogeriatrics*, Volume 25, Issue 1.
29. Ranajit Das et al; (2017) "The Origins of Ashkenaz, AshkenazicJews, and Yiddish PERSPECTIVE" Vol.:(0123456789) *Contemporary Jewry* (2024) 44: pp499–507.